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Abstract
This paper examines whether monetary expansion is a beggar-
thyself or beggar-thy-neighbour policy. Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995)
show that monetary expansion under producer currency pricing in-
creases domestic and foreign overall welfare, in cases where the cross-
country substitutability is high. If the cross-country substitutability
is low, then monetary expansion is a beggar-thyself policy that re-
duces domestic welfare and increases foreign welfare (Corsetti & Pe-
senti 2001; Tille 2001). In this paper, we will show that regardless
of whether the cross-country substitutability is high or low, monetary
expansion is always a beggar-thyself policy in the short run.
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1 Introduction
The U.S. Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank have implemented
expansionary monetary policies during the recent global recession in an at-
tempt to stimulate their economies. An important question about expansion-
ary monetary policies is whether such a policy stance is beggar-thy-neighbour
or beggar-thyself, that is, whether it is benecial or detrimental for the do-
mestic economy, and what the e¤ects are for the rest of the world. With
exible exchange rates and open capital markets, a permanent increase in
the supply of money depreciates the currency and increases exports and em-
ployment. From the perspective of the traditional Mundell-Fleming model,
this policy is beggar-thy-neighbour, and is recommended to the domestic
policy maker if increasing output is the policy goal.
Since the publication of the Redux model by Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995),
the question of whether a permanent monetary expansion is welfare improv-
ing or not has been analysed in the framework of fully micro-founded two-
country models.1 The welfare measure employed is the discounted present
value (DPV) of the change in utility of the domestic and foreign representa-
tive households. Obstfeld and Rogo¤ show that a monetary shock increases
the DPV of utility by the same amount in both countries, in cases where the
elasticity of substitution between goods produced in di¤erent countries (the
cross-country substitutability) is the same as the elasticity of substitution
between goods produced in the same country (the within-country substi-
tutability). On the other hand, Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Tille (2001)
nd that the gains in domestic output are more than o¤set by deteriorating
terms of trade, if the cross-country substitutability is lower than the within-
country substitutability.2
What has been missing until recently in this literature, however, was a
1Lane (2001) provides an early and extensive survey of the New Open Economy Macro-
economics literature. Lane and Ganelli (2003) focus on the exchange rate pass-through
debate and the role of the current account in adjustment dynamics. Corsetti (2007) pro-
vides a more recent survey.
2Further contributions to this literature challenging the basic results of Obstfeld and
Rogo¤ (1995) on the positive cross-country spillover e¤ects of monetary policy shocks
include Betts and Devereux (2000), Warnock (2003), and Tille (2008). Betts and Devereux
(2000) show that under local currency pricing a country may improve its terms of trade
and thus raise its consumption and welfare, at the expense of its neighbour. Warnock
(2003) shows that a beggar-thy-neighbour e¤ect can result in the presence of a home bias
in consumption. More recently, Tille (2008) shed light on the role of cross-country holdings
of di¤erent asset classes showing, inter alia, that cross-country equity holdings can reduce
the net dividend payments to the rest of the world when the money shock increases real
wages and reduces prots resulting in a positive welfare di¤erential.
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thorough analysis of the evolution of welfare over time.3 The contribution
of this paper is to go beyond the above-mentioned studies, which employ
simultaneous one-step-ahead pricing, and to analyse the welfare e¤ects of
monetary policy over time. To do this, we extend these models with the
Calvo-pricing mechanism.
The main nding of this paper is that the frameworks of Obstfeld and
Rogo¤ (1995), Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), and Tille (2001) in the end gen-
erate a common result: A monetary shock is a beggar-thyself policy in the
short run, no matter whether the cross-country substitutability is equal to
or is smaller than the within-country substitutability. The intuition behind
this result is the following: In all cases, a monetary shock causes an increase
in domestic output without an equivalent increase in consumption. In addi-
tion, we show that a high value of the cross-country substitutability implies
a higher decrease in domestic welfare in the short run. That is, the beggar-
thyself e¤ect is strongest in the Obstfeld-Rogo¤case. The main reason is that
a high cross-country substitutability implies a strong expenditure switching
e¤ect. This causes a high response of output (employment) without an equiv-
alent increase in consumption, due to a deterioration in the terms of trade
and the accumulation of net external assets.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: In section 2, we present the
model. In section 3, we analyse the welfare e¤ects of an unexpected shock to
the domestic money supply, using illustrative numerical simulations. Section
4 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
In this section, we develop a standard New Open Economy Model in the
tradition of the Redux model (Obstfeld & Rogo¤, 1995).4 The world economy
consists of two countries: home and foreign. There is a continuum of rms
and households that are indexed by z 2 [0; 1]. A fraction n of these are
located in the home country, while the remaining fraction 1 n are located in
the foreign country. Nominal price rigidity is introduced by the mechanism
proposed by Calvo (1983). This mechanism allows for an analysis of the
welfare e¤ects of monetary policy over time, which goes beyond the studies
of Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995), Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), and Tille (2001),
3In a related paper, Tervala (2010) analyses the question of how the welfare e¤ects of
monetary policy over time depend on the currency of export pricing, using a version of
the Betts-Devereux (2000) model.
4It is based on Betts and Devereux (2000), Pierdzioch (2006), Tille (2001), and Tervala
(2010).
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which employ simultaneous one-step-ahead pricing.
2.1 Households
2.1.1 Preferences
All households have identical preferences. The utility function of the repre-
sentative domestic household is given by5
Ut (z) =
1X
s=t
s t
"
logCs +

1  "

Ms
Ps
1 "
  `s (z)
2
2
#
; (1)
where  is the discount factor, C is a consumption index (dened below),
" and  are positive parameters, M is nominal money balances, P is the
consumer price index (dened below) and ` denotes the supply of labour.
The overall consumption index is
Ct =
h
n
1
 (Cht )
 1
 + (1  n) 1 (Cft )
 1

i 
 1
;
where Ch (Cf) is an index of domestic (foreign) goods and  > 0 measures
the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. As in Tille
(2001), this elasticity is referred to as the cross-country substitutability. The
consumption indexes are dened as
Cht =
24n  1 nZ
o
(Cht (z))
 1
 dz
35  1 ; Cft =
24(1  n)  1 1Z
n
(Cft (z))
 1
 dz
35

 1
;
where ch(z) (cf (z)) denotes consumption of domestic (foreign) good z and
 > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between goods produced in the same
country. Following Tille (2001), this is referred to as the within-country
substitutability.
The optimal allocation of consumption between di¤erent types of goods
is governed by the following equations:
Cht (z) =

pht (z)
P ht
  
P ht
Pt
 
Ct; C
f
t (z) =
"
pft (z)
P ft
#  "
P ft
Pt
# 
Ct;
Cht (z) =

pht (z)
P ht
  "P hy
P t
# 
Ct ; C
f
t (z) =
"
pft (z)
P ft
#  "
P ft
P t
# 
Ct :
5For the foreign country, equivalent equations apply unless they are explicitly discussed.
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The prices and price indexes are denoted as follows: pht (z) (p
f
t (z)) is
the domestic currency price of a domestic (foreign) good z, P ht (P
f
t ) is the
price index of domestic (foreign) goods and Pt is the domestic consumer
price index. All of these price indexes are expressed in domestic currency
terms. Analogously, for instance, pht (z) (p
f
t (z)) is the foreign currency price
of a domestic (foreign) good. The law of one price holds for each good so
that pht (z) = Stp
h
t (z), where S is the nominal exchange rate (the domestic
currency price of foreign currency). Therefore, the purchasing power parity
holds: Pt = StP t :
The domestic price indexes are given by
P ht =

n 1
Z n
0
pht (z)
1  dz
 1
1 
; P ft =

(1  n) 1
Z 1
n
pft (z)
1  dz
 1
1 
Pt =
h
n(P ht )
1  + (1  n)(P ft )1 
i 1
1 
:
2.1.2 Budget Constraints and Optimal Behaviour
The budget constraint of the representative domestic household is
Mt + tDt = Dt 1 +Mt 1 + wt`t   PtCt + t + Pt t: (2)
Here, t is the price of the bond (t = (1 + it)
 1, where it is the nominal
interest rate) that pays one unit of domestic currency in period t + 1, Dt
denotes bonds held at the beginning of period t, w is the nominal wage paid
to the household in a competitive labour market,  denotes the households
share of the nominal prots (dividends) of domestic rms, and  is a transfer
from the government (seigniorage revenues). All domestic households own
an equal share of all domestic rms.
The capital market is integrated and the only internationally traded as-
set is a domestic currency denominated bond.6 Consequently, the budget
constraint of a representative foreign household is
Mt + t
Dt
St
=
Dt 1
St
+Mt 1 + w

t `

t   P t Ct + t + P t  t : (3)
The optimal behaviour of households is governed by the following equa-
tions:
tPt+1Ct+1 = PtCt; (4)
tP

t+1C

t+1St+1 = P

t C

t St; (5)
6The aggregate asset-market-clearing condition is thus given by nDt + (1  n)Dt = 0.
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`t =
wt
CtPt
; (6)
`t =
wt
Ct P t
; (7)
Mt
Pt
=

Ct
1  t
 1
"
; (8)
Mt
P t
=
 
Ct
1  tSt+1
St
! 1
"
: (9)
Equations (4) and (5) govern the optimal consumption over time. Equations
(6) and (7) govern the optimal labour supply. Equations (8) and (9) show
the money demand functions.
2.2 Monetary Policy
We abstract from government spending so that the transfers to households
are given by
 t =
Mt  Mt 1
Pt
: (10)
The money supply is assumed to follow a rst-order autoregressive process
described by the following equation:
M^t = 'M^t 1 + M;t;
where percentage changes from the initial steady state (denoted by the sub-
script zero) are denoted by hats (M^t = dMt=M0), and M;t is an unpredictable
shock to the money supply (M;t  N(0; 2).
2.3 Supply Side: Firms
2.3.1 Prots and Demand
All rms produce a di¤erentiated good. The production function of the
representative domestic rm is
yt (z) = `t (z) ; (11)
where y (z) is the total output of it and ` (z) is the labour input used by it.
The rm maximises prots
t (z) = pt (z) yt (z)  wt`t (z) ; (12)
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taking into account the above production function and the demand curve it
faces
ydt (z) =

pht (z)
P ht
  
P ht
Pt
 
CWt ;
where CWt is the world demand (C
W
t = nCt + (1   n)Ct ). Therefore, the
prots can be written as
t (z) =

pht (z)
P ht
  
P ht
Pt
 
CWt
 
pht (z)  wt

:
2.3.2 Price Setting
In the absence of nominal rigidities, the domestic rm maximizes prots with
respect to pht (z), yielding the optimality condition
pht (z) =

   1wt: (13)
This means that the price of the good is a markup, determined by the within-
country substitutability, over the marginal cost.
To be able to analyse the behaviour of welfare over time we assume the
price setting structure of Calvo (1983). Each rm resets its price with a
probability 1    in each period, independently of other rms and the time
elapsed since the last adjustment. When setting its prot-maximizing price,
the rm has to take into account that in every subsequent period there is
a probability 0 <  < 1 that it will not be able to revise its price-setting
decision. Therefore, the rm maximises the discounted value of expected real
prots
max
pht (z)
Vt (z) = Et
1X
s=t
s tQt;s
s (z)
Ps
;
where E denotes expectations, and Qt;s is a stochastic discount factor be-
tween period t and period s. The rst-order condition can be written as
pht (z) =


   1
 EtP1s=t s tQt;s CWsPs  1Phs   PhsPs  ws
Et
P1
s=t 
s tQt;s

CWs
Ps

1
Phs
  
Phs
Ps
 : (14)
The log-linear version of equation (14) can be written as
p^ht (z) = Etp^
h
t+1(z) + (1  )w^t:
This equation simply states that the optimal price is the weighted average
of the current and future nominal marginal costs.
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2.4 Symmetric Equilibrium
All rms in a country are symmetric, so that every rm that changes its price
in any given period chooses the same output and sets the same price. The
structure of price setting implies that in each period a fraction of rms (1 )
set a new price, while the remaining fraction keep their price unchanged.
The consolidated budget constraint of the home economy is derived by
using equations (2), (10), and (12)7:
PtCt;= p
h
t (z) yt (z) +Dt 1   tDt: (15)
The model is log-linearized around a symmetric steady state where all
exogenous variables are constants and where initial net foreign assets are zero.
Equations (6), (11) and (13) imply that in the initial level of employment is
y0 = `0 =

   1

 1
2
:
2.5 Choice of Parameter Values
The choice of parameter values (if possible) follows Tille (2001), making it
easier to compare the results of this model with those of his model. The
within-country substitutability () is set to 6. The consumption elasticity of
money demand (1=") is set to 1. The relative size of the home country (n)
is set to 0.5. The domestic money shock is permanent (' = 1), and its size
is unity (M;t = 1).
In the model of Tille (2001) all prices are preset for one period, which
he interprets as one year, and fully exible after that. In a model with
the Calvo-price setting framework, it is more natural to interpret periods
as quarters. Therefore, the discount factor  is set to 0:99. In addition, the
price stickiness parameter () is set to 0.5, implying an average delay between
price adjustments of two periods. This is consistent with the ndings of Bils
and Klenow (2004).
The crucial parameter is the cross-country substitutability (). In the
basic setting, we use a value of 6 so that it is equal to the within-country
substitutability. In this case, the model replicates the results of Obstfeld
and Rogo¤ (1995). This a natural benchmark to analyse the implication of
lowering the cross-country substitutability to 3, 1 and 0.5.8
7The corresponding foreign equation is P t C

t = p
f
t (z) y

t (z)  n1 n
Dt 1
St
+ n1 nt
Dt
St
:
8We solve the model using the algorithm developed by Klein (2000) and McCallum
(2001).
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3 Welfare E¤ects of Monetary Policy
3.1 Method of Welfare Analysis
In many New Open Economy Models - including Corsetti and Pesenti (2001),
Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1996), and Tille (2001) - all prices are xed for one pe-
riod and the economy reaches the new steady state after that period. In this
case, the welfare e¤ect is the short-run change in utility plus the discounted
present value of the change in steady-state utility.
Due to staggered price setting in our model, a di¤erent method is needed
to evaluate the welfare e¤ects of monetary policy. We follow the same method
as in Ganelli and Tervala (2010) and Tervala (2010). First, we study the
change in period-by-period utility. Then, we calculate the discounted present
value (DPV) of these changes. The change in utility in period t is given by
U^t = C^t   `20 ^`t:
The DPV of these changes is
U^DPV =
1X
s=t
s tU^s:
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the changes in the periods utility. Table 1 shows
these changes in the rst period and in the steady state (SS). It also shows
the DPV of the change in utility.
Table 1: Welfare E¤ects of Monetary Shocks
U^1 U^

1 U^ss U^

ss U^DPV U^

DPV
 = 0:5 -0.062 0.13 -0.0036 0.0036 -0.47 0.57
 = 1 -0.13 0.19 0 0 -0.20 0.31
 = 3 -0.30 0.36 0.0040 -0.0040 -0.0092 0.11
 = 6 -0.43 0.49 0.0057 -0.0057 0.051 0.051
 = 9 -0.50 0.57 0.0065 -0.0065 0.074 0.028
3.2 Basic Case
Figure 1 (on page 18) shows the impulse response functions in the basic
case, where the cross-country substitutability is equal to the within-country
substitutability ( =  = 6). In this case, the model more or less replicates
the results of Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995) and those of Tervala (2010). We
regard this as a natural benchmark for the analysis in the next section.
In all gures, the vertical axes show percentage deviations from the initial
steady state, except for the change in bond holdings, which are expressed as a
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deviation from initial consumption. The domestic terms of trade are dened
as the relative price of domestic exports in terms of imports. Consequently,
its terms of trade improve if this index rises. The change in the terms of
trade is given by dToT t = b^t(z)  bSt   b^t (z), (16)
where b^t(z) and b^t (z) are, respectively, the Calvo-weighted prices of domestic
and foreign goods
b^t (z) = b^t 1 (z) + (1  ) p^ht (z) ;
b^t (z) = b^t 1 (z
) + (1  ) p^ft (z) :
The Obstfeld-Rogo¤ case is well-known in the literature. We therefore
focus on the behaviour of welfare over time. Staggered price setting does not
change the equation governing the behaviour of the exchange rate. Therefore,
it is determined by the same equation as in the Obstfeld-Rogo¤model (1995,
640):
S^t = (M^t   M^t ) 
1
"
(C^t   bCt ): (17)
In this way, the domestic money shock depreciates the exchange rate. This
lowers the relative price of domestic goods, shifting global demand toward
domestic goods and away from foreign goods, as long as prices are sticky.
This expenditure-switching e¤ect induces an increase in domestic output and
a decrease in foreign output.
The shock lowers the real interest rate and global consumption increases.
The households in both countries face the same real interest rate, implying
that the shock changes their consumption proles proportionately. However,
the expenditure-switching e¤ect causes a short-run increase in relative do-
mestic consumption. The domestic households save part of this extra income
by running a current account surplus. With higher long-run wealth, they de-
crease their labour supply. This decreases long-run output. A fall in the
supply of domestic goods causes an improvement in their terms of trade.
Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995) show that a monetary shock increases overall
utility (DPV of utility) by the same amount in the both countries, despite
asymmetric output e¤ects. The present model is consistent with this nding,
as Table 1 shows. The liquidity e¤ect of monetary policy increases world
output, bringing it closer to its e¢ cient level, and consequently increasing
overall welfare in both countries. Moreover, the behaviour of the terms of
trade provides the channel for sharing the benets of monetary policy equally.
The current account channel does a¤ect overall welfare due to intertemporally
optimizing households.
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In any case, the terms of trade and current account e¤ects have implica-
tions for the behaviour of welfare over time, as is shown in a related paper
(Tervala 2010). The accumulation of external assets and the deterioration in
the domestic terms of trade implies that domestic consumption increases less
than proportionally to output (employment). Monetary expansion, therefore,
is a beggar-thyself policy in the short run.
Panel (g) in Figure 1 and Table 1 shows that domestic utility increases
in the long run. Higher domestic wealth allows consumption to be higher
than output (recall equation (15)). This current account e¤ect and the im-
provement in the terms of trade have a favourable e¤ect on consumption and,
consequently, on welfare.
Panel (f) shows that the domestic shock increases foreign welfare in the
short run. This is because of an increase in consumption and a fall in em-
ployment (output). In the long run, foreign households work more, due to
lower long-run wealth, and output increases. This partly causes a deterio-
ration of the foreign terms of trade. In addition, the foreign country must
run a trade balance surplus to service the external debt. These current ac-
count and terms or trade e¤ects have a negative e¤ect on consumption and
consequently on welfare in the long run.
3.3 Low Cross-Country Substitutability
In this section, we examine what happens to the evolution of welfare over
time, when the value of the cross-country substitutability is reduced. In
this exercise, it is below the benchmark value of 6 and of the within-country
substitutability. As emphasised by Tille (2001, 422), this is likely to be
most relevant from the empirical point of view: If countries specialise in the
production of certain types of goods, the cross-country substitutability is
likely to be smaller than the within-country substitutability. As the opposite
case is less interesting, we report only the welfare results for  = 9 in Table
1.
Figure 2 and Table 1 show the e¤ects of varying the cross-country sub-
stitutability. The results regarding the DPV of the change in utility are
consistent with Tille (2001): A monetary expansion is a beggar-thyself policy
only if there is less substitutability across countries than within. A monetary
shock increases domestic output, but does not allow households to purchase
enough additional consumption to o¤set the cost of their e¤ort due to the
deterioration in the terms of trade. The higher deterioration in the domes-
tic terms of trade implies that the countries do not share the benets of
monetary policy equally, unlike in the Obstfeld-Rogo¤ case.
The present model, however, o¤ers important insights into the welfare
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e¤ects of monetary policy, once we focus on welfare dynamics. Table 1 and
Figure 2 show that reducing the value of the cross-country substitutability
implies a smaller decrease in domestic welfare in the short run. This happens
despite a higher short-run deterioration in the domestic terms of trade. We
also nd that regardless of whether the cross-country substitutability is equal
to or lower than the within-country substitutability, a monetary expansion
is in the short-run always a beggar-thyself policy, reducing domestic welfare
and increasing foreign welfare.
Let us focus rst on the case of  = 3: When domestic and foreign goods
are poorer substitutes, the depreciation of the nominal exchange rate induces
a weaker expenditure switching e¤ect towards domestic goods and away from
foreign goods. Both the increase of domestic relative to foreign output and
the absolute increase in domestic output fall, when compared with the ba-
sic (Obstfeld-Rogo¤) case. The latter implies that a money shock reduces
domestic welfare by a lower amount than in the basic case.
As shown by Tille (2001), the cross-country substitutability is equal to the
sum of the export and import elasticities, with respect to the terms of trade.
And, if it is greater than one, then the Marshall-Lerner-Robinson condition
holds and an exchange rate depreciation generates a current account surplus.
In this model, the smaller the cross-country substitutability is, the smaller
the increase in relative domestic income. Panel (e) of Figure 2 shows that
households have a smaller incentive to lend internationally, when compared
with the basic case. Therefore, the e¤ect of the current account channel on
domestic welfare becomes weaker. This is partly the reason why domestic
welfare is smaller than the basic case in the rst period after the shock.
The smaller value of  implies that for any given change of demand, a
bigger change in the terms of trade is needed to restore the equilibrium, as
pointed out by Tille (2001). In his model, all goods prices are xed in the
short run and only the nominal exchange rate can change the terms of trade
in the short run. In our model, two e¤ects change the terms of trade. The
smaller consumption di¤erential across countries increases the depreciation
of the nominal exchange rate (see equation (17)), as in Tille (2001). As this
e¤ect is rather small, the second e¤ect is more important here. In our model,
the relative price of domestic to foreign goods can also change among those
rms that are able to change their prices in the rst period (see equation
(16)). When domestic and foreign goods are poorer substitutes, a given
switch in demand requires a higher change in the optimal relative price of
domestic and foreign goods, which implies that b^t(z)   b^t (z) increases less
in this case. Even though the adjustment mechanisms are di¤erent in our
and Tilles model, in both models the deterioration in the terms of trade is
higher than in the basic case.
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A higher deterioration in the terms of trade implies smaller domestic
consumption. This causes a higher reduction in domestic welfare in the short
run. But it is, however, more than o¤set by the smaller current account e¤ect
and the smaller increase in output, so that the decrease in domestic welfare
is smaller than in the basic case in the short run.
The welfare e¤ects in the long run are reduced as the increase in accu-
mulated wealth is smaller. Table 1 also shows that the DPV of the change
in utility is, consistent with Tille (2001), negative for  = 3. The long-run
positive e¤ect of welfare is no longer large enough to compensate for the
negative short-run e¤ect.
The e¤ect on foreign welfare is driven by the opposite e¤ects following
the terms of trade adjustment: The smaller expenditure switching e¤ect
implies a smaller decrease in foreign output, thereby reducing the short-run
positive welfare e¤ect. At the same time, the lower reduction of bond holdings
decreases the long-run negative welfare e¤ect, as less e¤ort is needed to pay
interest on the foreign debt.
Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Tille (2001) have shown that in case of
 = 1, a money shock does not generate current account imbalances and a
deterioration in the domestic terms of trade reduces the DPV of the change
in utility. In this case, the increase in demand for domestic goods does not
increase the relative domestic income (and consumption) and consequently
there is no incentive to lend internationally. The assumption, therefore,
eliminates the current account channel. The results shown in Figure 2 and
Table 1 are consistent with the results of the above-mentioned studies.
The present model, however, illustrates an important new point. Re-
member that one of the main results of Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Tille
(2001) was that if the cross-country elasticity is unity, an exchange rate de-
preciation is a beggar-thyself policy, contrary to the welfare result of Obstfeld
and Rogo¤ (1995). Panel (g) and Table 1 show that if the cross-country elas-
ticity is unity, a fall in domestic welfare is much smaller than in the basic
Obstfeld-Rogo¤ case in the short run. A weaker expenditure switching ef-
fect towards domestic goods implies that the increase in domestic output is
smaller. Consequently, short-run domestic welfare falls by less than in the
basic case.
Even when reducing  to small values of below 1, the domestic welfare
e¤ect of monetary policy remains negative in the short run. The nding that
monetary policy is beggar-thyself in the short-run is thus a robust result. In
the case of  = 0:5, domestic and foreign goods are poor substitutes, and a
deterioration in the domestic terms of trade reduces the domestic sales rev-
enue. This is because the Marshall-Lerner-Robinson condition does not hold.
Therefore, a monetary expansion generates a fall in relative domestic income
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and consumption. The domestic household accumulates debt in the short-
run by running a current account decit. This tends to increase short-run
welfare. The terms of trade e¤ect, however, dominates the current account
channel to an extent that the increase in consumption is smaller than the
increase in output in the short-run.
In this case, domestic households, with lower long-run wealth, increase
their labour supply. This increases long-run output. An increase in the
supply of domestic goods causes a permanent deterioration in the terms of
trade. Therefore, Table 1 shows a fall in domestic utility in the long run.
Lower domestic wealth implies that output must be higher than consumption.
This current account e¤ect and the deterioration in the terms of trade have
a negative e¤ect on consumption and consequently on welfare.
The contribution of this paper is to analyse the welfare e¤ects of mone-
tary policy over time, going beyond the studies of Obstfeld and Rogo¤(1995),
Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Tille (2001) which employ simultaneous one-
step-ahead pricing. Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995) show that a monetary shock
increases the DPV of utility by the same amount in both countries. On the
other hand, Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), and Tille (2001), nd that the gains
in domestic output are more than o¤set by deteriorating terms of trade, if
the cross-country substitutability is low. In this paper, we have shown that
these frameworks in the end generate a common result: A monetary shock
is a beggar-thyself policy in the short run, whether the cross-country substi-
tutability is equal to or is smaller than the within-country substitutability.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we examined the question of whether an expansionary mon-
etary policy is beggar-thy-neighbour or beggar-thyself, within the context
of a standard open-economy model with imperfect competition and nominal
rigidities. Prior research has shed light only on the discounted present value
of welfare, an approach which misses the potentially important time dimen-
sion. It has shown that the cross-country substitutability is a key parameter
governing the international welfare e¤ects of monetary policy. Using a more
advanced method for welfare analysis, we show that, in the short-run, such
a policy is beggar-thyself, and that this result does not depend on the size
of the cross-country substitutability. In the rest of the world, welfare in-
creases in the short-run, while long-run e¤ects depend on the cross-country
substitutability both at home and abroad.
Supercially, one could conclude that the recent expansionary monetary
policies of the U.S. Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank can
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be expected to increase welfare only after some time. However, this policy
stance was a reaction to a severe recession, whereas our results are based on
the assumption of full employment. Therefore, a crucial assumption for the
welfare criterion employed is that monopolistic competition and price rigidi-
ties are the only distortions. Extending the model to allow for involuntary
unemployment due to labour market ine¢ ciencies would be an interesting
extension, and is left for future research.
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Figure 1: E¤ects of a Monetary Shock in the Basic Case ( =  = 6)
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Figure 2: Low Cross-Country Elasticity
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